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Abstract:   
A secure electronic cash  scheme and its role-based access control (RBAC) management are 
proposed in this paper.  The scheme uses electronic cash for payment transactions.   In this protocol, 
from the viewpoint of banks, consumers can improve anonymity if they are worried about disclosure 
of their identities. A new role called anonymity provider agent (AP) provides a high anonymous 
certificate for consumers during a payment processing.  The role AP certifies re-encrypted data after 
verifying the validity of the content from consumers, but with no private information of the consumers 
required.    Each consumer can get a required anonymity level through this new method, depending on 
the  available time, computation and cost.   Consumers can also use different banks (cross-payment) 
and anonymity provider agents (multiple APs) without double spending problems. 
  
  RBAC is widely used in system management and products since its advantages such as reducing 
administration cost and complexity.  However, conflicting problems may arise between roles when 
RBAC is applied for system management. For example, mutually exclusive roles may be granted to a 
user with RBAC and the user may have or derive a high level of authority. To solve these problems, 
we analyze the duty separation constraints of the roles and role hierarchies in the scheme,  then 
discuss how granting a role to a user.    
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1.    INTRODUCTION 
        E-commerce is the practice of buying and selling products and services over the Internet, 
utilizing technologies such as the Web, electronic data interchange, electronic fund transfers.  While 
E-commerce brings convenience for both consumers and vendors, many consumers have concerns 
about security of their private information when purchasing over the Internet, especially with 
electronic payment or e-cash payment. Consumers often prefer to have some degree of anonymity 
when shopping over the Internet. The issues on ensuring secure transactions for electronic commerce 
have attracted many researchers.  
 
        There are a number of proposals for electronic cash systems [6, 10, 17]. All of them lack 
flexibility in anonymity. For instance, David Chaum [6] first proposed an on-line payment system that 
guarantees receiving valid coins. This system provides some anonymity against a collaboration 
between shops and banks. However, consumers have no flexible anonymity and banks have to keep a 
very big database for consumers and coins.  Systems mentioned above are on-line payment systems. 
On-line payment systems protect the merchant and the bank against customer fraud, since every 
payment needs to be approved by the customer's bank.  This will increase the computation cost, 
proportional to the size of the database of spent coins. If a large number of people start using the 
system, the size of this database could become very large and unmanageable. Digicash [7] plans to use 
multiple banks each minting and managing their own currency with inter-bank clearing to handle the 
problems of scalability. It seems likely that the host bank machine has an internal scalable structure so 
that it can even be set up for a 1,000,000 consumer bank. However, under the circumstances, the task 
of maintaining and querying a database of spent coins is probably beyond today's state-of-the-art 
database systems [1].  
      
         Off-line payment  systems were designed to lower the cost of transactions due to the delay in 
verifying batch processes. Off-line payment systems, however, may suffer from the potential  double 
spending, whereby the electronic currency might be duplicated and spent repeatedly. 
 
     The first off-line anonymous electronic cash was introduced by Chaum, Fiat and Naor [9].  The security of 
their scheme relied on some restricted assumptions such as requiring a function, which is similar to random 
oracle and has to map onto a special range. There is also no formal proof attempted.  Although hardly practical, 
their system demonstrated how off-line e-cash can be constructed and lay the foundation for more secure and 
efficient schemes. In 1995, Chan, Frankel and Tsiounis [5] presented a provable secure off-line e-cash scheme 
that relied only on the security of RSA [20].  This scheme extended the work of Franklin and Yung [15] who 
aimed to achieve provable security without the use of general computation protocols. The anonymity of 
consumers is based on the security of RSA and it cannot be changed dynamically after the system is 
established. In 2000, David Pointcheval [19] presented a payment scheme in which the consumer's identity can 
be found any time by a certification authority.  So the privacy of a consumer cannot be protected.  
        Recently, role-based access control (RBAC) has been widely used in system management and 
operating system products. RBAC involves individual users being associated with roles as well as 
roles being associated with permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and operations). As such, 
a role is used to associate users and permissions. A user in this model is a human being (e.g. a staff 
member in a bank). A role is a job function or job title within an organization associated with 
authority and responsibility (e.g. role BANK manages money for consumers). Permission is an 
approval of a particular operation to be performed on one or more objects.  There are many 
relationships between users and roles, and between roles and permissions as shown in Figure 1.  
Assigning people to tasks is a normal managerial function. The assignments of  users to roles is a 
natural part of assigning users to tasks.  Hence,  user-role assignment is a basic issue of RBAC.    
 
          As mentioned above, the on-line e-cash payments need more computing resources. The 
previous designed off-line schemes do not provide efficient anonymity for consumers.   In this paper, 
we present a new electronic-payment model first, and then propose a flexible payment scheme,  in 
which the anonymity of consumers is scalable and can be done  by consumers themselves. Consumers 
can get a required anonymity without showing their identities to any third party. Furthermore, to 
reduce administration cost and complexity and to improve the security of the scheme, the basic issue 
of RBAC for the new payment scheme is discussed. 
 
         The paper is organized as follows. In the first two sections, some basic definitions and simple 
examples are reviewed. The payment model and the anonymity provider agent are described in section 
3. An off-line electronic cash scheme,  its security analysis including how to prevent  double-spending 
and an example of the scheme are shown in section 4. The relation of roles and  granting model are 
discussed in section 5.  Conclusions  are  included in section 6. 
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Figure 1: RBAC relationship 
2.   SOME BASIC DEFINITIONS 
      Hash functions:  H(x) is a hash function. For a given value W it is computationally hard to find an 
x such that H(x) = W, i.e. collisions are hard to find, where x might be a vector. 
      Hash function is a major building block for several cryptographic protocols, including pseudo-
random generators [3], digital signatures [4], and message authentication. 
 
      DLA and ElGamal encryption system: Discrete Logarithm  Assumption ( DLA ) is an 
assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be difficult. The discrete logarithm 
problem is as follows: given an element g in a group  G  of order q, and another element y of  G, find  
x, where 0< x < q - 1, such that y is the result of multiplying  g with itself x times, i.e. y = gx .  In 
some groups there exist elements that can generate all the elements of  G  by exponentiation (i.e. 
applying the group operation repeatedly) with all the integers from 0 to q - 1. When this occurs, the 
element is called a generator and the group is called cyclic. Rivest [21] has analyzed the expected time 
to solve the discrete logarithm problem both in terms of computing power and cost and  shown that it 
is computational hard to get x from y.   
      For this reason, it has been used for the basis of several public-key cryptosystems, including the 
famous ElGamal encryption system. The ElGamal encryption system [11] is a public key encryption 
scheme which provides semantic security. Let us briefly recall it. 
 
 Table 1. ElGamal encryption scheme 
   
  Step 1. The system needs a group G of order q, and a generator g.        The   secret key is an  
             element X in  Zp  = {0, 1, ..., q-1} and  the public key is Y=gX . 
  Step 2.  For any message m in  G, the cipher text of m is  c = (gr , Yr m), for a random 
             r   in Zp  -{0}. 
  Step 3.  For any cipher text c=(a, b), the message m can be retrieved by  m = b/aX. 
 
Table1 indicates that the message m can be obtained only by the person who has the secret key X.  
 
     Undeniable signature scheme and Schnorr signature scheme:  he undeniable signature scheme, 
devised by Chaum and  Antwerpen [8], is a non-self-authenticating signature schemes, where 
signatures can only be verified with the signer's consent. Schnorr, for example, proposed an 
undeniable signature scheme in 1991 [25]. It is simply recalled in Table 2. The signer is not able to 
deny the signature  Sch = (e, y) because the signature can be produced by the owner  of the secret key 
sk only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Schnorr signature scheme  
   
The system needs primes p and q such that q is divided by (p-1), i.e.  q|(p-1), g  in Zp  with order q, i.e. 
gq =1 (mod p), g does not equal 1.  A consumer   generates by himself a private key sk which is a 
random number in Zq.  The corresponding public key pk is the number pk=gsk  (mod p). 
To sign message m with the private key sk the consumer performs the following steps: 
1. Computes x=g r   (mod p), where r  in Zq  is a random number. 
2. Computes e=H(x, m), where  H  is a hash function.  
3. Computes y=r+sk*e (mod q) and output the signature Sch = (e,y). 
 
 To verify the signature Sch = (e,y) for message m with the public key pk a verifier computes     
  x+ =g y pk e (mod p) and checks e=h(x+ , m). 
 
Role based access control:  RBAC model supports the specification of:  
a. User/role associations; the constraints specifying user authorizations to  perform roles,  
b. Role hierarchies; the constraints specifying which role may inherit all of  the permissions of another   
     role,  
c. Duty separation constraints; these are role/role associations indicating  conflict of interest:     
       c1. Static separated duty (SSD); a constraint specifying that a user cannot be authorized for two  
             different roles, 
      c2. Dynamic separated duty (DSD); a constraint specifying that a user can be authorized for two  
             different roles but cannot act  simultaneously in both,  
 d. Cardinality;  the maximum number of users allowed, i.e.  how many users can be authorized for  
      any particular role (role cardinality), e.g., only one manager. 
       A comprehensive administrative model for RBAC must account for all four issues mentioned 
above, among others. However, user-role assignment is a particularly critical administrative activity. 
Because when administrators grant memberships in roles to users and revoke memberships from 
users, the process of granting depends on duty separation constraints and the revocation depends on 
role hierarchies. Therefore, this paper focuses on user-role assignments for the flexible payment 
scheme.      
 
3.    NEW PAYMENT MODEL 
          
        In the simplest form, an e-cash system consists of three parts (a bank, a consumer and a shop) 
and three main procedures as shown in Figure 2 (Withdrawal, Payment and Deposit).  In a coin's life- 
cycle, the consumer  first performs an account establishment protocol to open an account with the  
bank.  
BANK 
 
 
Figure 2:  Basic processes of an electronic cash system 
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     The consumers and the shops maintain an account with the bank, while:   
 
1.  A consumer withdraws electronic coins from his/her account, by performing a withdrawal protocol 
with the bank over an authenticated channel.   
2.   The consumer spends a coin by participating in a payment protocol with a shop over an 
anonymous channel. 
3.  The shop performs a deposit protocol with the bank, to deposit the consumer's coin into its account. 
 
     The system is off-line if the shop does not communicate with the bank during payment.  It is 
untraceable} if there is no p.p.t. TM (probabilistic polynomial-time Turing Machine) that can identify 
a coin's origin even if one has all the information of withdrawal, payment and deposit transactions. It 
is  anonymous if the bank, in collaboration with the shop, cannot trace the coin to the consumer.  
However, in the absence of tamper-proof hardware, electronic coins can be copied and spent multiple 
times by the consumer.  This has been traditionally referred to as double-spending.  In on-line e-cash, 
double-spending is prevented by having the bank check if the coin has been deposited before.  In off-
line e-cash, however, this solution is not possible; instead, as proposed by Chaum, Fiat and Naor [9], 
the system guarantees that if a coin is double-spent the consumer's identity is revealed with 
overwhelming probability. 
    There are also three additional processes: the bank setup, the shop setup, and the consumer setup 
(account opening).  They describe the system initialization, namely the creation and posting of public 
keys and opening of bank accounts.  Although they are certainly parts of a complete system, these are 
often omitted as their functionalities can be easily inferred from the description of the three main 
procedures.  
      Besides the basic participants, a third party named anonymity provider (AP) agent is involved in 
the scheme. The AP agent will help the consumer to get the required anonymity but will not be 
involved in the purchase process. The model is shown in Figure 3. The AP agent gives a certificate to 
the consumer when s/he needs a high level of anonymity.    
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                            Figure 3. Electronic cash model 
 
      The AP agent cannot merge with the bank, otherwise the consumer is not able to get a coin with a 
high level of anonymity.  We will discuss this case in detail in section 5. 
3.1   Anonymity Provider Agent 
      Here we explain what the AP agent is. Assume a consumer owns a valid  coin c with its certificate 
Certc , which guarantees correct withdrawal from the bank. Whether a coin is valid or not depends on 
its certificate. After the following processes with the AP agent, the consumer owns a new valid coin c' 
with its certificate Certc’. 
 
1.  The consumer re-encrypts the coin c into c'.  
2 . The consumer provides an undeniable signature Sch. 
3.  The consumer confirms the validity of this signature Sch to the AP agent. 
4.  The AP agent certifies the new coin c' and sends Certc’  to the consumer. 
 
       Indeed, after steps 2 and 3, the AP is convinced that the conversion has been performed by the 
owner of the coin c; c' is equivalent to c. The owner of c will not be able to deny Sch (the relation 
between c and c'). The AP agent only verifies the information of consumers. It does not need to know 
any private information about consumers.  
3.2     Proof of ownership of a coin 
       Let us assume that Y is the public key of the bank, xC  is a secret key of a consumer, and I=gxc  the 
identity of a consumer. H(x, y) is a hash function.  A coin is an encrypted message of I:  
c = (a=g r, b=Y r I s ) which is afterwards certified by the bank, where r, s are random numbers. With 
the certificate of the bank, one knows that the encryption is valid. Therefore, in order to prove his 
ownership, the consumer has just to convince of his knowledge of (xC , r, s) such that b=Y rI s . This 
can be expressed as follows. 
 
Table 3. Proof of validity of a coin  
   
  1. Consumers choose a random k  in Zp , then compute t= =Y k g s  (mod  p)  and   
        e=H(m,t) where m is a mixed message of c, current time etc, 
  2. Then compute u=k-re , v=s-xC  e , and    t 1 = g (s-1)e x c         (mod  p), 
  3. The signature finally consists of (e, u, v,  t1 ), 
 4.  In order to verify it, one has just to compute t'=Y ug v b e  (mod  p)  and check whether  
      t' = t t 1  (mod  p)   and e=H(m, t'/t1 ). 
      Then, a scrambled coin is got by multiplying both parts of the old one by respective bases, g and 
Y, both to the same random exponent ρ,  
c' = (a' = g ρ  a, b' =Yρ b) = (g (r+ ρ )  , Y (r+ ρ) I s ).    
Then, if the owner of the old coin has certified the message m' = h ρ, equivalence of both coins can be 
proven with the proof of equivalence of three discrete logarithms: 
log h  m’ = log g (a’/a) = log Y   (b’/b)                     (1) 
 Where h is a public variable. 
 
4.   A FLEXIBLE ANONYMITY PAYMENT SCHEME 
      In this section, we propose a scalable anonymity payment scheme. The new payment scheme has 
two main features, the first is that a consumer can have a high level of anonymity himself, the second 
is that the identity of a consumer cannot be traced unless the consumer spends the same coin twice.  
     The scheme includes two basic processes in system initialization (bank setup and consumer setup) 
and three main protocols:  a  withdrawal protocol with which a consumer withdraws electronic coins 
from a bank while his account is debited; a  payment protocol with which the consumer pays the coin 
to a shop; and a  deposit protocol with which the shop deposits the coin in the bank and has its account 
credited. If a consumer wants to get a high level of anonymity after getting a coin from the bank 
(withdrawal), s/he can contact the AP agent.  
 
4.1   System Initialization 
 
      The bank setup and the consumer setup are described as follows. The details of the shop setup are 
omitted because the shop setup is similar to the  consumer setup. 
 Bank setup:  (performed once by banks ) Primes p and q are chosen such that |p-1| =δ +k  for a 
specified constant  δ,  and p =  γ q +1, for a specified small integer γ.  Then a unique subgroup  Gq  of 
prime order q of the multiplicative group Zp  and generator g of Gq  are defined.  Secret key  xB  ∈ RZq 
for a denomination is created, where a  ∈ RA means that the element a is selected randomly from the 
set  A  with uniform distribution. Hash function H from a family of collision intractable hash functions 
is also defined.  The bank publishes p, q, g, H and its public key Y=g xB (mod p). 
       The secret key xB is safe under the Discrete Logarithm  Assumption ( DLA ) [11]. The hash 
function will be used in payment transactions. 
 
 Consumer setup :  (performed for each consumer)  The bank associates the consumer with I = g xC 
(mod p) where xC  ∈ Gq  is the secret key of the consumer and is generated by the consumer. 
      
After the consumer's account and the shop's account are opened,  the payment scheme can be 
described. 
 
4.2    New off-line payment scheme 
 
      We now describe the new anonymity scalable electronic cash scheme, which includes withdrawal, 
anonymity scalability,  payment and deposit.  
Withdrawal: (Consumers withdraw coins from the bank) 
      Usually, an anonymous coin is a certified message, which embeds the public key of a consumer. 
In our scheme, the message is an encryption of this consumer's public key, using the public key Y  of 
the bank.  
      The consumer I = g xC constructs a coin c=(a=g r, b=Y r I s ) using the public key Y of the bank, 
where s is the secret key of the coin, which is kept by the consumer and r is a random number in Zq.  
Using the private key xC,, the consumer signs a Schnorr signature Sch1 on the message of c together 
with the date etc. She/He sends (c, Sch1) to the bank together with r, I.  Then the bank can check the 
correct encryption. With the signature of the coin and the date, only the legitimate consumer could 
have done it. After having modified the consumer's account, the bank sends back a certificate Certc .  
     The consumer can use the coin now without a high anonymity since the bank can easily trace any 
transaction performed through the coin. This is because information of the consumer such as I, Certc  
are known by the bank. To solve this problem, a member in the AP agent is established to help the 
consumer to achieve a high level of anonymity: the consumer can derive a new encryption of his 
identity in an indistinguishable way. However, the consumer will need a new certificate for a new 
issued cipher text. The AP agent can provide this new certificate. Before certifying, the consumer 
requires both the previous coin (c, Certc) and the proof of equivalence between the two cipher texts. 
Details are described below. 
Anonymity scalability: (Performed between consumers and the AP agent) 
     The consumer contacts the AP agent if s/he needs to get a high level of  anonymity. The consumer 
chooses a random ρ  and re-encrypts the coin: 
c' = (a' = g ρ  a, b' =Yρ b)  
 
     1.   The consumer generates a Schnorr signature Sch2 on m’ = h ρ  using the secret key xC. Because 
of Sch2, the consumer will not be able to deny his knowledge of ρ  later. Furthermore, nobody can 
impersonate the consumer at this step, since the discrete logarithm xC  of  I is required to produce a 
valid signature. So there is no existential forgery. 
 
      2.   The consumer also provides a designated -verifier proof of equality of discrete logarithms  
log h  m’ = log g (a’/a) = log Y   (b’/b) 
 
       3.   The consumer finally sends c, c', Sch2, m to the AP agent. 
 
       4. The AP agent checks the certificate Certc on c, the validity of the signature Sch2 on the 
message m’, then certifies c' and sends back a certificate Certc’  to the consumer. 
 
      After these processes the consumer gets a new certified coin   c' = (a' = g ρ  a, b' =Yρ b)  and a 
new certification  Certc  which is now strongly anonymous from the point of view of the bank. The 
AP agent has to keep (c, c', m, S) to be able to prove the link between c and c', with the help of the 
consumer.  
 Payment: (performed between the consumer) 
When a consumer possesses a coin, s/he can simply spend it at shops by proving  knowledge of the 
secret key  (xC , s) associated with the coin c or c'. This proof is a signature  Sig = (e, u, v, t1 ) of the 
new certificate CertC’, purchase, date, etc with the secret key (xC , s)  associating the coin to the 
receiver (which is later forwarded to the bank).  
 
Deposit: (The receiver deposits a coin to a bank) 
The shop will send the payment transcript to the bank. The transcript consists of the coin c or c' (if the 
consumer applies a higher level of anonymity), the signature and the date/time of the transaction. The 
bank will verify the correctness of payment and credit the coin into the shop's account. 
 
Untracebility: The receiver (shop) deposits the coin into its bank's account with a transcript 
of the payment.  If the consumer uses the same coin c twice, then the consumer is traced: 
two different receivers send the same coin c to the bank. The bank can easily search its records 
to ensure that c has not been used before.  If the consumer uses c twice, then the bank has 
two different signatures. Thus, the bank can isolate the consumer and trace the payment to the 
consumer's account I.  
 
Remark:  There are no limits with shops and banks.  It means that consumers can use the coin 
At different shops as well as receivers can deposit coin to different banks.   This is because shops 
and banks in processes of the payment and deposit are verifiers only.    
4.3 Security Analysis 
      An off-line e-cash scheme is secure [15] if the following requirements are satisfied: 
 
1 Unreusable: If any consumer uses the  same coin twice,  the identity of the consumer can be 
computed. 
2 Untraceable: With n withdrawal processes, no p.p.t. (Probabilistic polynomial time) Turing 
Machine can compute (n+1)th distinct and valid coin. 
3  Unforgeable: With any number of the customer's withdrawal, payment and deposit protocols, no 
p.p.t. Turing Machine can compute a single valid coin. 
4 Unexpandable: With any number  of the customer's valid withdrawal, payment and deposit 
protocols, no p.p.t. Turing Machine can compute a legal consumer's identity. 
 
The security in the e-cash scheme is based on the hardness of Discrete Logarithms [28] and hash 
functions. The system preserves the above four requirements.   
     Unreusable: When a consumer spends  a coin, s/he hands over the coin together with a signature 
S=(e, u, v, t1 ) to a shop.  The consumer has the old coin c=(a=g r, b=Y r I s )  and the new coin c' = 
(a' = g ρ  a, b' =Yρ b).  The secret key of the consumer will be found when the old coin c or the new 
coin c' is used twice  (or the old coin and the new coin are both used ).  If the consumer uses a coin  c  
twice, then we have two signatures S1 =(e1, u1, v1 , t11 )  and  S2 =(e2, u2, v2 , t12 ), where 
                 u1  = k1   - r e1  (mod q),   v 1  = s – x C e 1 (mod q)  
                 u2  = k2   - r e2  (mod q),   v 2  = s – x C e 2 (mod q)  
Then  (v2 – v1 )/(e1 –e2 ) = xC , this is the secret key of the consumer I. The same result will be 
obtained if the new coin c' is used twice or the old coin and the new coin are both used.  This means 
there is no double-spending.   
     Untraceable: When a consumer constructs a coin, s/he uses the secret keys xC  and s, both of which 
are not shown to any other parts  in the purchase process. So no one can trace the consumer and the 
coin. 
     Unforgeable: We first discuss whether the bank and the AP agent can forge a valid coin or not. To 
produce a valid coin, the first requirement is making a encryption c=(a=g r, b=Y r I s ) of I. The 
second requirement is using the secret key xC of the consumer to sign a Schnorr signature for c 
together with the current time.  The bank can do the first step but cannot do the second step since it 
does not know the secret key xC . This means the bank cannot forge a valid coin. Similarly, the AP 
agent cannot forge a valid coin either. It should be noted that even though both the bank and the AP 
agent know a valid coin, they still couldn't use it. This is because there is a signature in payment 
process, which can only be done by the consumer.  
     As already seen, the secret key xC  of a consumer is never revealed; only used in some signatures. 
A consumer is therefore protected against any impersonation, even from a collusion of the bank, the 
AP agent, and  the shop. Only the consumer can construct a valid coin since there is a undeniable 
signature embedded in the coin. To prevent the bank from framing the consumer as a multiple spender 
in the scheme, we use digital signature I s for s which is known only by the consumer. Then the 
system is unforgeable. 
     Unexpandable:  For a legal consumer and a valid coin, the secret key xC and the random number s 
are never shown to others at anytime. Furthermore, usually the random number s will be changed for 
different coins.  With n withdrawal proceedings, the random number s  will be changed n times.  
Then, no one can compute the (n+1)th distinct and valid coin even if they see n  proceeding 
withdrawals.  
4.4 An example 
      We give a simple example of the flexible payment scheme that will show the main steps in the 
processes. We omit the details of two undeniable signatures in the withdrawal and in the scalable 
anonymity process, because they are only used for verifying the consumer.  
 
Bank setup 
      Suppose (p, q, γ, k) = (47, 23, 2, 4), then Gq ={0,1,2,...,22} is a subgroup of order 23.  g = 3 is a 
generator of Gq. The bank's secret key  xB  = 4 and hash function H(x,y)=3 x * 5 y. The bank publishes 
H(x,y) and {p, q, g}= {47, 23, 3}. The public key of the bank is Y=g xB (mod p) = 34. 
Consumer setup 
      We assume the secret of a consumer is xC  = 7  and the consumer sends  
I = g xC (mod p) = 32  to the bank. After checking some identification like social security card or 
driver's license, the bank authorizes the consumer with I. 
      After the bank setup and the consumer setup, the consumer can purchase. 
 Withdrawal 
      The consumer chooses (r, s) = (2,3) and computes c =  (9, 2) , then signs a Schnorr signature Sch1 
for the message (c, t), where t is the current time. The consumer sends  c = (9, 2)  and Sch1 to the 
bank, the latter sends back a certificate Cert C .  
      Data c and Cert C  are known by the bank. Therefore the consumer can be traced by the bank if 
s/he uses the coin directly. S/He contacts the AP agent to achieve a high level of anonymity. The 
consumer and the AP agent follow the processes below. We suppose h = 37 is a public number. 
Anonymity scalability 
      The consumer re-encrypts the coin c, chooses ρ = 4 and computes c' = (24, 14) and signs a Schnorr 
signature Sch2 on m1 = 36. Finally, the consumer sends (c, c', Sch2, m1) to the AP agent. The latter 
verifies the Schnorr signature Sch2 and the equation (1), and sends a certificate Cert C’  to the 
consumer if they are correct. 
      Since the new coin c' = (24, 14) and its certificate Cert C’ have no relationship with the bank, the 
consumer gets a level high of anonymity. 
Payment 
     The consumer signs a signature S = (e, u, v, t1) of a message m2 which includes  c', Cert C‘  and 
purchase time etc to prove the ownership of the new coin. For convenience, we assume m2 = 11. The 
consumer chooses k = 5 then computes t = Y k  g s  (mod p) = 19 ,  e = H(m2, t) (mod p) =  40, u = 18, 
v = 5, t1 = 28.   
     The shop  who is convinced that the consumer is the owner of the coin computes  t' = 15  if the 
equation of  t' = t t1 and the signature S are successful. She/He does not know who the consumer is. 
Deposit 
     The bank will put the money into the shop's account when the checking of the coin c' = (24, 14)  
and the signature S  = (40, 18, 5, 28) are correct. The shop can also see that the money in his account 
is added.  
     There are four roles in the scheme, BANK, SHOP, CONSUMER and AP that are acted by a bank, 
a shop, a consumer and an AP agent respectively. The coin c and its certificate Cert C   are known by 
the role BANK while the new coin c' and its certificate Cert C‘   are known by the role AP. BANK will 
get c' and Cert C‘  if merging the AP agent with the bank, and then the consumer cannot get a high 
level of anonymity. Therefore, BANK and  AP are mutually exclusive roles and they cannot assign to 
an individual. It shows that user-role assignment is an important issue for the flexible payment 
scheme.       
5.  USER-ROLE ASSIGNMENT 
     Sandhu and Bhamidipati developed a model called URA97 in which RBAC is used to manage 
user-role assignment [24]. It does not discuss user-role assignments for  electronic commerce. We will 
analyze user-role assignment for the new scheme in this section. Before analyzing user-role 
assignment of the new scheme, we need to consider the relationships of roles. 
5.1   Duty separation constraints 
       There are two types in duty separation constraints. One is SSD and another one is DSD. In Figure 
4,  for example, since all staff in the AP agent, the bank and the shop are employees, their 
corresponding roles inherit the role EMPLOYEE. Role AP, SHOP and BANK have  DSD 
relationships with role CONSUMER. This indicates that an individual consumer cannot act the roles 
of  AP, SHOP or BANK simultaneously. The staff in these three participants have to first log out if 
they want to register as consumers. For example, a consumer, who is a staff member of the AP agent 
and is able to act the role AP, can ask the AP agent to help him to get a coin with a high level 
anonymity. But as a consumer,  s/he cannot give herself/himself a new certificate Cert C’   of a coin 
when s/he works for the AP agent. Another staff member of the AP agent should do the job for this 
person.  
 
AP AGENT BANK SHOP 
SSD SSD
DSD DSD DSD
CONSUMER EMPLOYEE 
    VISITOR 
 
Figure 4: The relationships of the roles in the scheme 
 
      AP  has an SSD relationship with BANK. This is because the duty of  AP is to help a consumer to 
get a coin with a high level of anonymity. BANK knows the old coin c = ( g r , Y r I s ) and its 
certificate Cert C.  AP  sends the new certificate Cert C’   of the new coin c' = (g (r+ ρ )  , Y (r+ ρ) I s ) to the 
consumer. BANK will know the new certificate Cert C’   and new coin c'  if the same staff member 
from the AP agent and the bank processed the coin for the consumer. If this occurs, the consumer 
cannot have a coin with the required anonymity because BANK has known the new coin. SHOP also 
has an SSD relationship with BANK since  BANK verifies the payment as well as depositing the coin 
to the shop's account. The SSD relationship is also a conflict of interest relationship like the DSD 
relationship but much stronger. If two roles have a SSD relationship, then they may not even be 
DSD SSD 
Indicate inheriting relationship
Indicate SSD and DSD relationships respectively
authorized to the same individual. Thus, the role AP, BANK, and SHOP  may never be authorized to 
the same individual. 
5.2    Granting models 
 
      RBAC administration encompasses the issues of assigning users to roles, assigning permissions to 
roles, and assigning roles to roles to define a role hierarchy. These activities are all required to bring 
users and permissions together. In many cases, they are best done by different administrators. To 
analyze granting and revocation models, we add  a manager role ( M1) etc in an AP agent,  a manager 
role (M2) etc in a bank, a manager role (M3) etc in a shop and some administrative roles  Senior 
Officer(SSO) etc in the system as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.  A hierarchy of roles and a 
hierarchy of administrative roles are also shown in these two Figures. Senior roles are shown towards 
the top of the hierarchies and junior are to the bottom. Senior roles inherit permissions from junior 
roles. The roles in  Figure 5can be granted and revoked by the administrative roles in Figure  6.  
      Let x> y denote x is senior to y with obvious extension to x >= y. The notion of a prerequisite 
condition is a key part in the processes of user-role assignment [24]. 
      Prerequisite condition is an expression using Boolean operators ∧ and ∨ on terms of the form x  
and    x  and  where x is a role and ∧ means ``and", ∨ means ``or". A prerequisite condition is 
evaluated for a user u by interpreting x to be true if  ∃ x' >= x, (u, x') ∈ UA  and  x  to be true if ∀ x' 
>= x), (u, x') ∉ UA,  where UA is a set of user-role assignments.  
       For a given set of roles R let CR denote all possible prerequisite conditions that can be formed 
using the roles in R. Not every administrator can assign a role to a user. The relation of can-assign ⊆ 
AR × CR ×  2 R provides what roles an administrator can assign with  prerequisite conditions, where 
AR is a set of administrative roles.  
      User-role assignment (UA) is authorized by can-assign relation. Table 4 shows the can-assign 
relations with the prerequisite conditions in the new scheme. To identify a role range within the role 
hierarchy of Figure 5, we use the familiar closed and open interval notation. 
 
[x, y]  =  { r ∈ R | r >= x  ∧   y >=  r},   (x, y]  =  { r ∈ R | r > x    ∧  y >=  r } 
[x, y)  =  { r ∈ R | r >= x  ∧  y  >   r },     (x, y)  =  { r ∈ R | r > x    ∧  y > r } 
 
      Let us consider the APSO tuples (the analysis for BankSO and ShopSO are similar). The first 
tuple authorizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite role FPS into members in the AP agent 
(AP). The second one  authorizes APSO to assign users with the prerequisite condition FPS ∧ OP to 
be quality controllers (QC). Similarly, the third tuple authorizes APSO to assign users with the 
prerequisite condition FPS ∧ QC to be operators (OP). The second and third tuple show that the APSO 
can grant a user who is a member of the AP agent into one but not both of QC and OP. This illustrates 
how mutually exclusive roles can be forced. However, for the NSSO and SSO these are not mutually 
exclusive. The fourth tuple authorizes APSO to put a user who is a member of both QC and OP into a 
manager (M1). Of course, a user could have become a member of both QC and OP only by actions of 
a more powerful administrator than APSO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. can-assign 
   
   Admin.role                              Prereq.Condition                                    Role Range 
      APSO                                          FPS                                                   [AP, AP]     
    APSO                                        FPS  ∧  OP                                         [QC, QC]     
    APSO                                        FPS  ∧ QC                                          [OP, OP]     
     APSO                                         QC  ∧  OP                                          [M1, M1]   
    NSSO                                           FPS                                              (FPS, DIR)     
       SSO                                              E                                            [FPS, FPS]   
      SSO                                              FPS                                           (FPS, DIR]   
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this paper, a secure payment scheme and its access management are proposed. The new scheme 
provides different degrees of anonymity for consumers. Consumers can decide the levels of 
anonymity. They can have a low level of anonymity if they want to spend coins directly after 
withdrawing from the bank. Consumers can achieve a higher level of anonymity through the AP agent 
without revealing their private information. From the viewpoint of the bank, it is more secure because 
the new coin and its certificate  come from the AP agent who is not involved in the payment process.   
The duty separation constraints of the four roles in the scheme and  how to grant a role to a user 
associated with a can-assign relation are discussed. 
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Figure 5.  User-role assignment 
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Figure 6: Administrative role assignment 
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